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CASENOTES
Reformulating the Tax Benefit Rule: Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner and
United States v. Bliss Dairy, inc.' — The tax benefit rule requires that, where a deduction
in a prior year reduced the taxpayer's taxable income, recovery of the deducted item in a
subsequent year must be reported as income in the year of recovery.' The need for such a
recapture principle arises because the tax system is based on annual accounting periods. 3
In such a system, each year's deductions are necessarily determined from facts known in
that year.' When an event occurs in a subsequent year which changes the facts on which
the earlier deduction was based, the tax benefit rule is applied to correct the distortion in
tax liability that would otherwise exist.`' In a common example, a taxpayer properly
deducts local property taxes from his federal income tax, thereby reducing his taxable
income. • Later he receives a refund for a portion of those taxes. Because the refund
reduced the amount of the taxpayer's deductible expenditure, that refund must be
reported as income in the year it was received. 6 Similarly, a taxpayer might property
deduct the amount of a debt when he determines that there is little possibility of future
repayment. If the debt is later repaid, that repayment must be reported as income in the
year it was received.'
The tax benefit rule is not expressly stated in the Internal Revenue Code (the Code),
but instead has evolved through the case law.s In the early decisions, the theory underly-
ing the rule was rarely articulated but can be inferred from the language of the courts'
opinions.9 These early cases, which generally involved repayment of bad debts, shared
two important factual elements: a prior deduction and a subsequent recovery.' The
interrelationship of these elements was crucial to the operation of the rule. In the absence
of the prior deduction, a bad debt later repaid was considered to be a "return of capital"
to the taxpayer." A return of capital, being simply a reimbursement for the taxpayer's
' 460 U.S 370 (1983). Both cases will be found under the name Hillsboro Nat'l Bank. Id.
Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399, 401 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Putoma Corp. v.
Comm'r, 66 T.C. 652, 664 n. 10 (1976), aff'd, 601 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1979); see generally Plumb, The
Tax Benefit Rule Today, 57 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1943); 1 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION § 7.43 (J. Doheny rev. ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as J. MERTENS].
3 See Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 365 (1931); I.R.C. 1 441 (1982).
• Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(3) (1960); Estate of Block v. Comm'r, 39 B.T.A. 338, 341 (1939), of 'd
sub nom. Union Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 111 F.2d 60 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 658 (1940);
Feld, The Tax Benefit of Bliss, 62 B.U. L. REV. 443, 443 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Feld]; Bittker &
Kanner, The Tax Benefit Rule, 26 UCLA L. Ray. 265, 265 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Bittker Sc
Kanner].
• Estate of Munter v. Comm'r, 63 T.C. 663, 678 (1975) (Tannenwald, J., concurring).
▪ Bittker Sc Kanner, supra note 4, at 265.
7 Id.
• 1 J. MERTENS, supra note 2, § 7.34, at 114. The tax benefit rule has two components,
inclusionary and exclusionary: recovery of an item previously deducted must be included in income;
recovery is excluded where the earlier deduction resulted in no benefit. Putoma Corp. v. Comm'r, 66
T.C. 652, 664 n.10 (1976), The exclusionary rule was codified in 1.R.C. § 111, which by implication
assumed the inclusionary component. Id. This casenote focuses exclusively on the inclusionary
component.
• Bittker Sc Kanner, supra note 4, at 267.
14 Id. at 272; Lyon Sc Eustice, Assignment of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P.C. Lake Case,
17 TAX L. REV. 295, 403 (1962).
" Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v. Rothensies, 43 F. Supp. 923, 925 (E.D. Pa. 1942).
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earlier loss, was not taxable as income.' Where the taxpayer deducted the loss, however,
the situation was different. The tax savings produced by the deduction were in effect
compensation to the taxpayer for the loss.' 3 If, then, after taking the deduction the
taxpayer was later repaid by the debtor, the taxpayer was compensated twice." That
second compensation, called a "recovery," produced a windfall to the taxpayer.' 5 By
characterizing the recovery as taxable income under the tax benefit rule, the courts could
recapture that windfall.' The interaction of the two elements, the prior deduction and
the subsequent recovery, thus triggered application of the rule in most early cases.'
Later cases applied the tax benefit rule to more complex fact situations, such as where
the taxpayer took the deduction before actually making the deductible payment."' A
business might, for example, take a deduction for the cost of goods purchased, and later
write off that cost without ever having paid the seller."' In these cancellation-of-indebted-
ness cases, there would be no actual recovery because the taxpayer had neither made the
payment owed nor received a cash reimbursement." The transaction could exist entirely
on the taxpayer's books. Nevertheless, the tax benefit rule was applied in such situations
to balance the prior deduction. 2 ' .
Although the scope of the tax benefit rule thus expanded to include cancellations of
indebtedness as well as actual cash refunds, the rule continued to depend upon a finding
of "recovery" to the taxpayer who took the deduction.'' The courts, however, did not
articulate a definition of "recovery" or a clear theoretical basis for requiring 4. 23 This
failure became acutely apparent in the late 1970's, when the courts were faced with a
number of cases involving property transfers in the context of corporate liquidations."
To reach these complex fact situations, the courts again reinterpreted the rule, but not in
any consistent way.'' Some courts looked for the presence of a recovery, however defined,
' 2 Id.; Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399, 401 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
" National Bank of Commerce of Seattle v. Comm'r, 115 F.2d 875, 876-77 (9th Cir. 1940).
' 4 Id.; Laeger, The Tax Benefit Rule — Recent Supreme Court Developments, Tax Management
Memorandum 3, 3 (July 11, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Laeger].
•	 " Perry v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 270, 273 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
' 6 Id.
17 See Lassen, The Tax Benefit Rule and Related Problems, 20 TAXES 473, 477 (August 1942)
[hereinafter cited as Lassen].
' 5 Mayfair Minerals, Inc. v. Comm'r, 456 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1972) (termination of liability held
to be a recovery where taxpayer deducted refunds to customers that were later cancelled); Bear Mfg.
Co_ v. United States, 430 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971) (accrued and
deducted royalty payments held to be income when contract dispute over payment of royalties settled
in favor of taxpayer).
' See Roxy Custom Clothes Corp. v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 851, 852 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
2° See, e.g., Bear Mfg. Co. v. United States, 430 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1970).
2 ' South Dakota Concrete Products Co. v. Comm'r, 26 B.T.A. 1429, 1431 (1932).
" Tennessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Comm'r, 582 F.2d 378, 384 (6th Cir. 1978)
(Weick, J., concurring and dissenting); Feld, supra note 4, at 449.
" Lassen, supra note 17, at 476.
24 Feld, supra note 4, at 457; Byrne, The Tax Benefit Rule as Applied to Corporate Liquidation
Contributions to Capital: Recent Developments, 56 No-rim DAME LAW 215, 219 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Byrne].
" Compare Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Comm'r, 641 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
906 (1982) (refund to shareholde'rs of tax paid and deducted by bank held recovery to bank after
repeal of tax, because refund was constructive dividend) with Tennessee-Carolina Transportation,
Inc. v. Comm'r, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978) (remaining useful life of fully expensed tires and tubes
held "receipt" by liquidating corporation).
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while others analyzed the legislative purpose of the deduction to determine whether
subsequent events made the prior deduction unwarranted." Predictably, the holdings
seemed to vary according to the focus of the court, so that the resulting case law lacked
any coherent underlying principie.'27 This confusion culminated in a split in the circuits
over the questions of the proper definition of recovery and the importance of a recovery
to the application of the tax benefit rule.' To resolve this division in the circuits, the
United States Supreme Court decided Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissionern and United
States v. Bliss Daisy, Inc,n and, in the process, reformulated the tax benefit rule.
Hillsboro National Bank arose out of a change in the Illinois personal property tax."
Before 1970, shareholders of any incorporated bank within the state were subject to a
personal property tax on the value of their shares." The banks, required under state law
to keep sufficient funds on hand to cover these taxes, customarily paid the taxes for their
shareholders. 33 This practice was followed by the Hillsboro National Bank." Under
section 164(e) of the Internal Revenue Code, the bank was allowed to deduct the amount
of this tax from its corporate income. 35 The shareholders did not reimburse the bank. 36
In 1970, Illinois amended its constitution to prohibit ad valorem taxation of personal
property owned by individuals.' The Illinois Supreme Court, in Lake Shore Auto Parts Co.
v. Korzen, 38 struck down the amendment in July 1971, on the grounds that it violated the
equal protection clause of the United States Constitution: 3a The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari in the case.' Pending the Court's disposition of the question, the
Illinois legislature passed an interim measure directing that the disputed taxes be paid
into an interest-bearing escrow account.' The statute further specified that if the con-
stitutional amendment were upheld, the taxes would he refunded directly to the share-
holders." Accordingly, Hillsboro National Bank paid $26,110.32 into the escrow ac-
count." The bank, as was its practice, deducted this amount on its 1972 federal income
tax return." In 1973 the Illinois amendment was upheld by the United States Supreme
24 See infra notes 50-103 and accompanying text.
" Lassen, supra note 17, at 476.
" Compare Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963) (held no
recovery to liquidating corporation where it distributes fully expensed unharvested crop in liquida-
tion) with Tennessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Comm'r, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978) (recov-
ery found when liquidating corporation distributed fully expensed but unconsumed tires and tubes
to parent corporation in liquidation). See Krieger, Tax Accounting: Tax Benefit Rule and Liquidations —
Recent Developments, 8 J. CORP. TAX'N 357, 360 (1982).
n 460 U.S. 370 (1983).
3° Id.
n ILL: REV. STAT., ch. 120, § 557 (1971).
" Id.





" 49 Ill. 2d 137, 273 N.E.2d 592 (1971).
39 Id. at 151, 273 N.E.2d at 599.
4° 405 U.S. 1039 (1972).
41 Hillsboro Nat'l Bank, 641 F.2d at 530.
42
 ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 120, § 676.01.
4'
 641 F.2d at 530.
44 Id.
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Court.'" The County Treasurer therefore issued refund checks for the taxes plus interest.
directly to Hillsboro Bank's shareholders, payable solely to them." The bank was neither
informed nor consulted regarding the refund."
Hillsboro Bank reported no income from this sequence of events on its 1973 tax
return.'" The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (the Commissioner) assessed a
deficiency against the bank, directing that it report the tax refund paid to its shareholders
as income." On the bank's petition for a redetermination, the Tax Court held that, under
the tax benefit rule, the amount of the taxes was includible in income as a form of
constructive recovery from the state. 5° After the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed," the bank petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was
granted:"
In Bliss Dairy the taxpayer was a closely held corporation engaged in the business of
operating a dairy." During its fiscal year ending June 30, 1973, the corporation pur-
chased cattle feed, at a cost of $150,199, for use in its dairy operations." On its federal
income tax return, the dairy deducted the full cost of the feed pursuant to Internal
Revenue Code section 162, which allows deductions for the ordinary and necessary
expenses of carrying on a trade or business.' A substantial portion of the feed was still on
hand at. the end of the taxable year." Two days into the next taxable year, the corporation
adopted a plan of liquidation pursuant to sections 333 and 336 of the Internal Revenue
Code." As required by section 333, within one month the corporation distributed its
assets, including the unconsumed feed, to its shareholders, who continued to operate the
dairy in unincorporated form. 58 On its final tax return, the corporation reported no gain
on t he distribution, relying on the nonrecognition provisions of section 336. 5" On their
individual tax returns, the shareholders elected to limit their recognized gain pursuant to
section 333, which allows certain types of shareholders to defer recognition of gain in the
distribution of assets until the assets are converted into capital." Using section 334(c), the
45
 Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973).
" 641 F.2d at 530.
Id.
" Id.
" Id. The deficiency assessed was the amount of the taxes refunded by the state to the bank's
shareholders. Id.
50 Id.
" Id. at 531. The Court of Appeals relied on its earlier decision in First Trust and Savings Bank
v. United States, 614 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1980), a case arising under the same change in Illinois
property taxes, in which the refund checks were made jointly payable to the bank and its sharehold-
ers. Id. Unlike Hillsboro National Bank, First Trust enjoyed an "actual recovery" because the refund
checks were made jointly payable to it. However, such a technical interpretation, according to the
Hillsboro Nat'l Bank Court, represented only one of the two alternative grounds in First Trust. 641 F.2d
at 531. In addition to the actual recovery, First Trust was liable because the refund was a later event
inconsistent with the deduction taken under § 164(e). 614 F.2d at 1146.
5' 457 U.S. 1103 (1981).
" Bliss Dairy, Inc. v. United States, 645 F.2d 19, 19 (9th Cir. 1981).
" Id.
" United States v. Bliss Dairy, Inc., 460 U.S. 370, 374 (1983).
" Id.
n Id. For a discussion of section 333, see infra notes 321, 324; for section 336, see infra notes
151-53 and accompanying text.
." Bliss Dairy, Inc. v. United States, 645 F.2d 19, 20 (9th Cir. 1981).
" United States v. Bliss Dairy, Inc., 460 U.S. 370, 374-75 (1983).
" Id. at 375. See infra notes 325 -30.
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shareholders calculated their basis in the distributed assets by allocating their basis in the
stock of the liquidating corporation over all the assets received.' A portion of this basis in
the stock was therefore allocated to the unconsumed feed, which had had a zero basis in
the hands of the corporation as a result of the prior deduction. 62 On audit, the Commis-
sioner assessed a deficiency of $60,000, the value of the distributed feed, against the
corporation. 63 Bliss Dairy paid the tax due and sued for a refund in the United States
District Court for the District of Arizona." Relying on Commissioner v. South Lake Farms,
Inc.,65 the district court held for the dairy. 66 Although recognizing authority to the
contrary in other circuits, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 67 The
government then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was
granted.°
In a consolidated opinion, the United States Supreme Court reversed the lower
courts in both Hillsboro National Bank and Bliss Daily," The Court reformulated the tax
benefit rule by abandoning reliance on the recovery requirement in favor of an "inconsis-
tent event" analysis that focuses on the nature of the prior deduction," The Court held
that, unless a nonrecognition provision of the Internal Revenue Code prevents it, the tax
benefit rule ordinarily applies to require the inclusion of income when events occur that
are fundamentally inconsistent with an earlier deduction.'
The Supreme Court's reformulation of the tax benefit rule represents a confusing
and unwarranted addition to the tax law. Although the recovery requirement was too
rigid to accommodate the increasing variety of fact patterns to which it was being applied,
the "inconsistent event" formulation adopted by the Court errs in the opposite direction.
The new rule fails to give the Internal Revenue Service and the courts sufficient guidance
as to what constitutes an inconsistent event. The Court's formulation requires a case-by-
case analysis, which may make it difficult for taxpayers to predict whether any given
transaction falls under the tax benefit rule. In particular, the Court's decision raises
uncertainty about the extent to which the rule should be applied in various corporate
liquidations, where pressure for reform of the rule has been the greatest. The rule's
judicial recapture policy appears to conflict with the policies underlying the applicable
Code provisions, which allow for nonrecognition of gain in certain liquidations. Finally,
the Court's significant expansion of the scope of the rule raises questions about the proper
role of a judicially created rule in the tax laW. The confusion that this rule is likely to
generate seems to argue for a statutory, rather than a judicial, solution.
This casenote will begin by examining the early development of the tax benefit rule.
The discussion will demonstrate that the rule lacked coherent underlying principles on
which to ground any expansion of its scope beyond the simple fact situations of the early
" Miss Dairy, 460 U.S. at 375-76.
62 Id. at 376.
61 Id. The income tax on this amount was $28,000. Brief for Respondent in No. 81-930 at 182,
Bliss Dairy, Inc. v. United States, 645 F.2d 19 (9th Cir. 1981).
" Bliss Deity, 645 F.2d at 20.
65
 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963). For a description of the South Lake facts and opinion, see infra
notes 154-65 and accompanying text.





	Nat'l Bank v. Comm'r, 460 U.S. 370, 395, 402 (1983).
7° Id. at 381, 383.
7 ' Id. at 372.
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cases. The casenote will then discuss the special pressure for change exerted on the rule
by cases arising in the area of corporate liquidations. After a presentation of the Court's
reasoning, the casenote will conclude with a discussion of the merits and implications of
the reformulation. It will be submitted that, because application of the rule is dependent
upon a determination of the purpose underlying the deduction, the new formulation can
lead to multiple and conflicting results in cases where the applicable deduction may reflect
more than one legislative purpose. The casenote will alSo argue that, in the context of
corporate liquidations, the rule should have been formulated narrowly, to reach only
those situations in which the corporation's basis in the deducted asset was not carried over
to the shareholders. Lastly, it will be submitted that, because other judicial principles were
available on which to decide the two cases, the Court should have refrained from
expanding the tax benefit rule, and should instead have left to Congress the question of
whether to extend recapture principles. The casenote concludes with a proposal for
legislative reform that focuses on the change in basis effected by the transaction as a way
to determine recapturable gain.
I. THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE. TAX BENEFIT RULE
When a taxpayer recovers an amount previously deducted, the tax benefit rule
requires that the amount recovered be reported as income in the year it was received."
This statement describes the fact patterns of the earliest cases in which the tax benefit rule
was applied." Although the courts universally held on these facts that the recovery was
income to the taxpayer,' the statement of the rule, by itself, does not suggest any
principle on which the recovery could be considered income. The statement does not
indicate, for example, whether both a deduction and a recovery are necessary to produce
income in the transaction. Being a mere generalization from the facts, the formulation
was too crude to provide an adequate foundation from which to extend the rule to more
complicated transactions.
The theoretical limitations of the early rule became apparent as courts began to
consider more complicated transactions where no actual refund was present. To identify
a theoretical principle on which to find income to the taxpayer in these cases, these courts
experimented with various rationales to justify their findings of income." Despite their
efforts, however, no underlying principle for applying the tax benefit rule emerged," and
as a result the case law in this area remained confused and inconsistent. 77
A very early case, Excelsior Printing Co. v. Commissioner, 78
 exemplifies the typical fact
pattern to which courts could respond without articulating a coherent rationale. In
Excelsior, the corporate taxpayer deducted the amount of a loan to a bankrupt corporation
72 See supra note 2.
" See Estate of Block v. Comm'r, 39 B.T.A. 338 (1939). The principle underlying the rule is
always stated in terms of the facts of the cases, not in terms of an extrinsic theory, so that the rationale
becomes somewhat circular. See, e.g., Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399, 402
n.2 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
n Estate of Block v. Comm'r, 39 T.C. 339, 341-42 (1939).
See infra notes 78-95 and accompanying text.
Bittker & Kanner, supra note 4, at 267.
" Id.; Lassen, supra note 17, at 476.
" 16 B.T.A..886 (1929). The United States Board of Tax Appeals, which decided most of these
early cases, was renamed the Tax Court of the United States by the Revenue Act of 1942.
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as a bad debt. 79 Nine years later the corporate taxpayer was repaid the full amount of the
loan under the will of the bankrupt corporation's sole stockholder. 8° The Board of Tax
Appeals (Board) simply held that "since the payment constituted payment of a debt which
the taxpayer had previously charged off, we must hold that it was taxable income to the
taxpayer in [the year of repayment].""' The Board noted the presence of both the prior
deduction and the later recovery, but made no explicit connection between the two.
Ten years later the Board attempted a more technical explanation .for its application
of the rule where t he taxpayer received no actual refund of an amount paid out. In Grace
M. Barnett v. Commissioner," the taxpayer leased her Texas land to an oil company for
drilling, and took a deduction for the projected oil depletion." When the lease expired
without the company ever having drilled, the Commissioner sought to recapture the
amount of the earlier deduction under the tax benefit rule. 84 Despite the absence of an
actual refund of an amount previously paid out, the Board of Tax Appeals applied the
tax benefit rule to find that the taxpayer had to restore to income the amount previously
allowed as a deduction." The Board stated:
The [depletion] deduction allowed for 1934 was proper but was granted
conditionally.... Depletion is an allowance made for exhaustion of the prop-
erty. The lease was terminated in 1935 without any exhaustion ever having
taken place. The petitioner thereupon became required under the regula-
tions to restore to income the amount previously allowed as a deduction in
respect to the 241 acres.'
On this rationale, the taxpayer's deduction was conditioned on the occurrence of an event
— the exhaustion of the oil reserves — which did not in fact occur. Following from this
reasoning, the deduction was no longer warranted due to the non-occurrence of the event
on which the deduction was premised. Failure of the condition thus triggered application
of the rule and consequently a finding of income to the taxpayer.
Lacking a refund or actual recovery, the Barnett opinion focused on the conditional
nature of the deduction as the key factor in finding income to the taxpayer. Another,
more expansive rationale, again focusing on the deduction rather than on the subsequent
repayment, was suggested in the language of Estate of Block v. Commissioner. 87 In Block, the
executor of an estate deducted the amount of state inheritance taxes from the estate's
federal income taxes. 88 Subsequently, the state raised inheritance taxes retroactively, and
the executor paid the additional amount due." The executor deducted the additional
79 16 B.T.A. 886 (1929).
80 Id,
" Id. at 888. The transaction in Excelsior involved a taxpayer who used the cash method of
accounting. Under that method, a taxpayer has taxable income when a cash payment is received.
Similarly, a taxpayer can deduct a payment only when he actually pays out the amount. The
distinction between cash and accrual methods of accounting, see infra note 98, becomes important in
the analysis of later tax benefit rule cases, where the fact situations involve no actual payment or
receipt. One source of the tax benefit rule's growing pains has been its later application to accrual
method taxpayers. See infra notes 96-115 and accompanying text.
83 39 B.T.A. 864 (1939).
83
 Id. at 865.
8'
" Id. at 868.
" Id. ai 867.
" 39 B.T.A. 338 (1939).
" Id. at 339.
" Id.
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state inheritance taxes from the federal income taxes, which resulted in a refund of
federal taxes.' The estate did not report that refund in the year it was received."'
Applying the tax benefit rule, the Board of Tax Appeals held that the refund was taxable
income to the estate." The presence of a refund in Block conformed exactly to the
traditional tax benefit rule fact pattern, but the Board supplied additional language to
explain its result." 3
 According to the Board, "when recovery or some other event which is
inconsistent with what has been done in the past occurs, adjustment must be made in
reporting income for the year in which the change occurs.""
The "inconsistent event" test of Block seemed to take the Barnett idea of a conditional
deduction one step fur( her. Barnett applied the tax benefit rule where the event on which
the deduction was conditioned failed to occur."' The Block rationale, by contrast, found
income upon the occurrence of any event inconsistent with what had been clone before —
that is, inconsistent presumably with the deduction. While inconsistency was a more
flexible, subjective test than the failure-of-a-condition standard suggested in Bartlett, both
rationales raised definitional problems requiring courts to identify the failed condition or
the inconsistency before applying the rule.
In the absence of a theory or principle to justify a finding of income, then, these
courts had to experiment with differing rationales or explanations for why the rule
should be applied. That these differing rationales produced confusion in the law is best
illustrated by one of the the most often cited cases to arise in the area before the
appearance of the corporate liquidation cases. In Nash v. United States,' decided in 1970,
the United States Supreme Court relied on the language of recovery and did not address
specifically the various rationales developed in the lower courts."' As a result the decision
both exemplified and furthered the confusion created by the coexistence of the
recovery-based and deduction-based rationales.
Nash represented the culmination of a series of cases involving bad debt reserves,
which were allowed as a provisional deduction to cover uncollectible accounts receivable."
9" Id.
9 ' Id. at 340.
" Id. at 341.
" Id.
" Id. The same argument has been made in the more common case of assets, the cost of which
are deducted as business expenses under section 162. See I.R.C. § 162(a) (1982). For example, a
taxpayer in the restaurant business may deduct the cost of paper napkins that she plans to use in the
operation of her restaurant during that taxable year. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-3 (1982). Section 162
allows this deduction on the premise that the expensed assets will be consumed in the year. If she
miscalculates her need for napkins and fails to use up her whole supply during that year, however,
the question arises whether the cost of the remaining napkins should be reported as income on her
following year's tax return. In general, the tax system ignores this income for reasons of administra-
tive convenience, but, in theory, the amount of an asset's remaining useful life that was currently
deducted in a prior year is taxable income in the subsequent year under the tax benefit rule. See Note,
Tax Treatment of Previously Expensed Assets in Corporate Liquidations, 80 MJcH. L. Rev. 1636, 1642-43
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Tax Treatment of Previously Expensed Assets]. This theory was applied
in Tennessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Comm'r, 65 T.C. 440 (1975), see infra notes 171-93 and
accompanying text.
" See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
" 398 U.S. 1 (1970).
" Id. at 5.
98 Id. at 2. Taxpayers like the partnership in this case are permitted to take deductions before
actually making payments because they are on the accrual method of accounting. See Treas. Reg. §
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In Nash, a partnership operating eight Finance offices incorporated and transferred its
assets to the eight new corporations.° 9 Among the assets transferred were the partner-
ship's accounts receivable.'°° The amount of the accounts receivable transferred was
reduced by the amount of the bad debt reserve, for which the partnership had taken a
deduction in the previous year.' Applying the tax benefit rule, the Commissioner
determined that the amount previously deducted by the partnership for its bad debt
reserve should be reported as income because the partnership's need for the reserve
ended when its business terminated.'° 2 The partnership paid the deficiency and brought
suit for a refund." The district court allowed recovery, and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.'" Reversing the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court
held that the tax benefit rule did not apply to the matter before it because no "recovery"
had occurred within the meaning of the rule."
In choosing to focus on the absence of a recovery, the Court rejected the Commis-
sioner's "end of need" argument, which was reminiscent of the conditional deduction idea
of Barnell." The Court noted that the partnership had received a tax benefit from its
earlier deduction of the bad debt reserve.' 01 But according to the Court, there was no
second, or additional, tax benefit because the reserve was not recovered by the partner-
ship." The Court explained t that the partnership had transferred the accounts receivable
minus the bad debt reserve to the corporations," In exchange, the Court noted, the
partnership had received securities equal in value to the accounts receivable minus the
reserve."° The Court concluded that the transfer did not alter the underlying economic
position of- the taxpayer."' According to the Court, the transfer produced no gain or loss,
and therefore no recovery, to the taxpayer,'"
Nash represented the confrontation between recovery-based and deduction-based
rationales for applying the tax benefit rule that had been developed through the case law.
In the tradition of Barnett, the Commissioner argued that the case turned on the nature of
the deduction, which he characterized as conditional on the partnership's need for the
reserve."' The Court responded in the language of recovery," 4 never expressly address-
1.446(1)(c)(ii) (1973). The accrual method pegs realization of income on the occurrence of events
that fix the taxpayer's right to receive the income. Id. Likewise, an accrual method taxpayer can
deduct a loss or payment on the occurrence of events that fix the obligation to pay. Id. For a
discussion of the relationship between the tax benefit rule and these two accounting methods, see
Surrey, The Revenue Act of 1939 and the Income Tax Treatment of Cancellation of Indebtedness, 49 YA LE L.J.
1153, 1175-77 (1940).
398 U.S. at 2. This transaction was tax-free under section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code,
which provides that no gain or loss shall be recognized on the transfer of property in incorporation.
' n" Id. at 2-3.
of Id. at 5.
Id. at 4.
'" Id. at 3.
1 " Id.
os Id. at 3, 5.
1" Id. at 3-4. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
'" 398 U.S. at 4-5.






14 Id. at 5.
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ing the validity of the Commissioner's deduction-based rationale." 9
Because the Court in Nash remained a captive of the old recovery formulation,
without elucidating any underlying principle for the rule, the case simply carried on the
confusion in the tax benefit area. Later litigants and scholars, for example, have relied on
the case for support for the recovery requirement."" Other scholars have argued that,
based on Nash, recovery must be understood more broadly as an economic benefit."'
Finally, some courts have persisted in focusing on the deduction, and have gone so far as
to drop the requirement of recovery altogether."" Even after Nash, then, the problem of
identifying a theoretical principle to justify a finding of income has remained unsolved.
As this section has shown, the case law development of the tax benefit rule, culminat-
ing in Nash, demonstrates how the courts varied and expanded the original elements of
recovery and deduction to reach complicated fact patterns that fell outside the original
patterns. This pressure to expand the rule was especially intense in cases involving
corporate liquidations." 9 The next section considers the further development of the rule
to meet the specialized fact patterns that arise in these cases.
IL THE TAX BENEFIT RULE AND CORPORATE LIQUIDATIONS
In the area of corporate liquidations, the courts' ability to choose between recovery-
based and deduction-based rationales in applying the tax benefit rule ultimately led to a
split in the circuits.t 1D The corporate liquidation cases pushed the tax benefit rule to the
limits of its rationales because of the complexity of z he transactions involved. One source
of this complexity is the double taxation of corporations, at both the corporate and
shareholder levels,m Because the taxpayer taking the deduction may not be the taxpayer
enjoying the gain, determining the presence of a recovery may be complicated. Whether a
recovery has occurred in such a situation has been decided both ways in the courts.' 2:'
A second source of complexity is the Internal Revenue Code provisions them-
selves. 123 The genesis and policy underpinnings of these corporate liquidation provisions
are complicated, and in some instances, conflicting.' 24 Questions involving the proper
interaction of these statutory provisions with the judicially created tax benefit rule thus
increase the number of issues any court must consider in liquidation cases. The liquida-
Id.
sis Tennessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Comm'r, 65 T.C. 440, 449 (1975); O'Hare,
Application of the Tax Benefit Ride in New Case Threatens Certain Liquidations, 44 J. TA X'N 200, 202 (April
1976) [hereinafter cited as O'Hare, Liquidations].
' 17 Note, Application of the Tax Benefit Rule to Corporate Distributions of Expensed Assets Under I.R.C.
Section 336,29 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 700, 718 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Corporate Distributions
of Expensed Assets], See Estate of Munter v. Comm'r, 63 T.C. 663, 681 (1972) (Tannenwald, J.,
concurring).
'" Tennessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Comm'r, 582 F.2d 378, 382 (6th Cir. 1978); see
Rev. Rul. 74-396, 1974-2 C.B. 106 (tax benefit rule does not require an economic recovery).
"9 Cartano, The Tax Benefit Rule in Corporate Liquidations, 10 J. CORP. TAX'N 216, 221 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Cartano].
' 2° See Tennessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Comm'r, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978);
Comm'r v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963).
" 1 See Hellmich v. Hellman, 276 U.S. 233 (1928) (holding that both the corporation and the
shareholders may be taxed); see also I J. MERTENS, supra note 2, § 9.02.
'" Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d 837, 839 (9th Cir. 1963).
123 I.R.C. §§ 331-38.
'' See, e.g., infra notes 337-38.
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tion event is also unique in that it terminates the business and forces a final accounting of
gain or loss on the corporation's ongoing transactions. 155 Liquidation, therefore, is the last
time the Treasury can tax the corporation on its gain.' As a result, some courts have
sought to interpret the tax benefit rule more broadly in an attempt to reach this otherwise
tax-free gain.' 27
This section considers the theoretical questions posed by application of the lax
benefit rule in liquidation cases. The section also traces various interpretations of the rule
that have arisen on these fact patterns. As will he demonstrated, the trend in the courts
has been either to elaborate on the role of the deduction while retaining a shell of
recovery language, or to eliminate the recovery requirement altogether.
A. Section 337 Liquidations
In general, a corporation liquidates by exchanging its cash and property for the
outstanding stock held by its shareholders. "8 In t his exchange, the corporation's property
can be either distributed to the shareholders in kind, or sold and the cash proceeds
distributed.' The tax benefit rule was first applied in the latter situations, where the
liquidating corporation sold its property and distributed the cash proceeds to the share-
holders.m Under the tax benefit rule, the proceeds from the sale of assets, the cost of
which had been previously deducted, would be characterized as taxable income to the
liquidating corporation. 13 ' The rule thus recaptured the prior deductions, despite a
' 25 B. BIrrKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS,
§ 11.02, at 11-14 (3d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE].
1 '6 Id. § 11.61, at 11-47.
'' See infra notes 171 -89 and accompanying text.
' 26 Treas. Reg. § 1.333-1(b)(1) (1960); see Rev. Rul. 54-518, 1954-2 C.B. 142; see generally Blawie,
Some Tax Aspects of a Corporate Liquidation, 7 TAX L. REV. 481 (1952).
1.R.C. §§ 336, 337; Bonovitz, Taxable Dispositions of a Corporate Business Before and After
TEFRA, 60 TAXES 812, 812 (1982). I.R.C. § 337 provides in . pertinent part:
(a) General Rule. — if, within the 12-month period beginning on the date on which a
corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation, all of the assets of the corporation
are distributed in complete liquidation, less assets retained to meet claims, then no gain
or loss shall be recognized to such corporation from the sale or exchange by it of
property within such 12-month period.
Section 337 can best be understood in terms of section 336. Section 336 codified the common law
doctrine of General Utilities Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935), that market appreciation of assets
should not be taxed in the distribution of assets in liquidation. Section 337 was enacted to give the
same protection to the taxpayers that sold their assets preparatory to liquidating. See generally B.
BFITKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 125, §§ 11.63, 11.64.
'" See Citizens Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 462 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1972) (on preliquida-
don sale of accounts receivable, finance company on accrual method required to report bad debt
reserves previously deducted); Connery v. United States, 460 F.2d 1130 (3d Cir. 1972) (pharmacy
company on accrual method required to report prepaid advertising costs previously deducted, when
assets sold in liquidation); Spitalny v. United States, 430 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1970) (proceeds from sale
of unconsumed expensed cattle feed taxable to extent of gain over liquidating corporation's basis);
Commissioner v. Anders, 414 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 958 (1969) (tax benefit rule
requires inclusion in income when previously expensed items were sold in a section 337 liquidation).
For a discussion of these and other cases, see Note, The Tax Benefit Rule and Corporate Liquidations:
Baiting the "Trap for the Unwary", 4 J. CORP. L. 681, 691-94 (1979).
Ill See, e.g., Estate of Winter v. Comm'r, 63 T.C. 663 (1975), discussed infra notes 135-41 and
accompanying text.
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statutory provision, Internal Revenue Code section 337, specifically exempting such
liquidating distributions from recognition of gain to the corporation."'
Liquidations under section 337, the statutory nonrecognition provision covering
distribution of cash proceeds from the sale of a corporation's property, were natural
candidates for application of the tax benefit rule under a recovery-based rationale. 133
Just as in the early bad debt cases where the prior deduction compensated the taxpayer
for his loss, in the corporate context the prior deduction compensated the corporation for
the cost of the asset. When the corporation later sold its previously deducted, or "ex-
pensed," assets, the sale proceeds would in effect compensate the corporation a second
time. The proceeds from a preliquidation sale of expensed assets, then, constituted an
actual recovery to the corporation to the extent of the previous deduction.' 3 ' The tax
benefit rule required the liquidating corporation to report that amount as income in the
year of -the sale.
A 1975 case, Estate of Munter v. Commissioner,'" typifies the way the tax benefit rule
was applied in section 337 liquidations. In Murder, a linen supply service sold its assets to a
competitor and distributed the cash proceeds to its shareholders in liquidation. 136 Among
the assets sold were rental linens, the cost of which had been deducted previously.' 37
Relying on section 337 the corporation recognized no income on the sale, and the
Commissioner assessed a deficiency against the corporation.' 3s On the corporation's
petition for a redetermination, the Tax Court held that, despite section 337, the corpora-
tion was required by the tax benefit rule to recognize gain on the sale of the expensed
linens.'" According to the court, "there [was] no question" that the corporation realized
an economic recovery of the portion of the sale proceeds directly attributable to the prior
deduction.'" If that portion of gain were to escape recognition under section 337, the
court stated, the corporation would enjoy a second tax benefit not contemplated by the
nonrecognition provision.'
In section 337 cases, the preliquidation sale, like the tax refund or loan repayment in
the earlier cases, constituted a recovery. Thus, the tax benefit rule could readily be
applied without any change in the nature of the recovery requirement. These section 337
cases added a new dimension to the tax benefit rule analysis, however, by introducing into
the opinions the technical language of basis.' According to general principles of tax
Morrison, Assignment of Income and Tax Benefit Principles in Corporate Liquidations, 54 TAXES
902, 916 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Morrison]; O'Hare, Statutory Nonrecognition of Income and the
Overriding Principle of the Tax Benefit Rule in Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders, 27 TAX L. REV.
215, 223 (1972) [hereinafter cited as O'Hare, Corporations and Shareholders]. The purpose of section
337 is to protect the gain represented by the market appreciation in the distributed assets. Estate of
Munter v. Comm'r, 63 T.C. 663, 673 (1975). Consequently, where an asset's fair market value has
increased since its acquisition by the corporation, that appreciation is not recognized as income to the
corporation in liquidation. Id. at 673.
'4 Morrison, supra note 132, at 916; O'Hare, Corporations and Shareholders, supra note 132, at
223.
'' Morrison, supra note 132, at 916.
' 35 Estate of Munter v. Comm'r, 63 T.G. 663 (1975).
'" Id. at 666.
' 37 Id. at 665.
138 Id. at 665, 668.
1 '9 Id. at 667.
14° Id. at 671, 673.
141
 Id, at 676.
'" See Byrne, supra riot e 24, at 218-19.
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theory, the "basis" of an asset is the value assigned to it by the tax system, against which
gain or loss front a subsequent sale or disposition is measured. 13 Basis analysis provided
the courts with a mechanical test for determining whether any gain had resulted from the
transaction.' The term "recovery - is a less inclusive term than "gain - because recovery
suggests the return of something to the same person who expended that something in the
first place. Thus, insofar as "gain" was a broader concept than "recovery," the courts' use
of basis analysis provided a means for expanding the scope of the tax benefit rule. At the
sante time, the presence of a gain, thus proved, advanced courts one step closer to proving
the presence of a "recovery."
A 1970 case, Spitalny v. United States,"5 illustrates how basis analysis contributed to
application of the tax benefit rule. In Spitalny, a corporation in the business of fattening
cattle sold unused cattle feed, the cost of which it had previously deducted, and distrib-
uted the cash proceeds in liquidation.' The Ninth Circuit could have couched its opinion
solely in terms of recovery, as the Munter court had done.'" Instead, the court framed the
issue as whether the full amount of the corporation's gain over its basis in the feed should
be protected by section 337.' 46 According to the court, when the corporation deducted the
full cost of the feed in the year of purchase, it. reduced its basis in the feed to zero.'"
When the liquidating corporation later sold the unconsumed feed, the court stated, the
entire proceeds of that sale were gain over the zero basis. 1 s" As gain, the proceeds would
he taxable to the liquidating corporation under the tax benefit rule.
In section 337 cases, the basis analysis thus produced the same tax result as the
recovery-based rationale: the liquidating corporation was taxed on the proceeds from
sales of expensed assets. The capacity of basis analysis to expose gain in a transaction,
however, provided a way to expand the recovery-based rationale and supplement the
deduction-based rationale. As the next section demonstrates, this expansion occurred in
the context of section 336 liquidation cases.
B. Section 336 Liquidations
In the section 337 cases, as suggested previously, the concepts of basis and gain were
not crucial to a determination of the case, because the preliquidation sale constituted an
actual recovery to the corporation that had taken the deduction. In section 336 liquida-
tions, however, the corporation does not recover amounts previously deducted through a
preliquidation sale.' 51 Instead, the liquidating corporation distributes its assets to the
shareholders in kind. 15' This in-kind distribution presents theoretical obstacles to a
recovery-based application of the tax benefit rule, because in-kind distributions produce
14 .3 I.R.C. § 1012 (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1012-1(a) (1960). In most instances the basis would start
out as the cost of' the asset. Id.
'" See Spitalny v. United States, 430 F.2d 195, 198 (9th Cir, 1970).
1" 430 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1970).
`-` 6 Id. at 196.
1" See Estate of Munter v. Comm'•, 63 T.C. 663, 671 (1975).
148 Spitalny v. United States, 430 F.2d 195, 196 (9th Cir. 1970).
'" Id. at 197.
150 id.
"' Tennessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Comm'r, 65 T.C. 440, 449-50 (1975) (Tannen-
wald, J., dissenting).
15
"- 1.R.C. § 336 provides in part: "(a) General Rule. — ... no gain or loss shall be recognized to a
corporation on the distribution of property in complete liquidation."
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no cash recovery to the corporation that took the deduction.' 53 Rather, the unrealized
gain in the assets is transferred to the shareholders rather than being converted to cash by
the corporation, Consequently, the corporation that took the deduction can argue that its
shareholders, rather than it, directly enjoyed the gain.
The facts of a Ninth Circuit case, Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, lrac., 154 illustrate
he conceptual difficulty in finding a recovery in these section 336 cases. In South Lake
Farms, a corporation in the business of farming sold out to a second farming operation
through a stock purchase.' The purchasing corporation immediately liquidated the old
corporation and took over its assets.° Among these assets were an unharvested cotton
crop and hundreds of acres of farmland prepared for planting a barley crop.'" The
liquidated corporation had deducted the costs of planting and preparation for planting
prior to liquidation.''" Relying on section 336, the liquidated corporation recognized no
gain on the transfer of these fully expensed assets, and the Commissioner assessed a
deficiency.'" On the government's appeal from the Tax Court decision for the taxpayer,
the Ninth Circuit held that the tax benefit rule could not be applied to recapture the
deductions.'" According to the court, the liquidating corporation itself had not received
any consideration for the distribution of its assets to the shareholders of the purchasing
corporation, and therefore had not recovered its earlier deductions as through a sale.'
The court recognized that gain was created in the transfer, in that the prior deductions
had enhanced the price that shareholders of the liquidating corporation received for their
stock.' 6 ' That higher price, the court noted, was a gain to the shareholders directly
attributable to the prior deduction. 163
 The court found in the Code, however, no intent to
tax the corporation on gains to its shareholders.'" According to the court, the liquidating
corporation should be taxed only on its own income. 16'
The court's failure in South Lake Farms to find a recovery on a distribution in kind
illustrates the conceptual limitations of the recovery-based rationale. Any court that, as in
South Lake Farms, chooses to equate recovery with consideration can readily find both in a
section 337 liquidation, because the proceeds of a preliquidation sale can be characterized
as consideration received by the liquidating corporation in exchange for its assets. Apply-
ing the tax benefit rule to a distribution in kind under section 336, by contrast, requires a
'5' Morrison, supra note 132, at 916.
n 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963).
' 5" Id. at 841.
15' Id. at 841-42.
1" Id.
' 58 Id. at 842. Although normally depreciable, these costs would be allowed as current deduc-
tions under Internal Revenue Code section 461, which allows certain kinds of farmers to use the cash
basis method of accounting. See 'I'reas. Reg. § 1.162 - 12 (1960).
1511 324 F.2d at 839.
1 " Id.
Id. at 839-40; O'Hare, Liquida/ions, supra note 116, at 200. Conceptually the court was
equating "consideration" with a refund.
'" Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d 837, 839 (9th Cir. 1963). The prior
deductions enhanced the price of the stock in two ways. First, the amount of the corporation's taxable
earnings and profits had been reduced by the prior deduction. Id. Second, the deducted expendi-








more sophisticated analysis, which can be furnished using the basis principles applied by
the Spitalny court.
Under the Spitalny basis analysis the question would he not whether the corporation
that took the deduction received an actual recovery, but rather whether the transfer
created a gain over basis. In South Lake Farms, the court conceded the presence of such
gain. '66
 As a result of having deducted the full costs associated with planting and prepara-
tion,' 67
 the liquidating corporation had a zero basis in the crop and fields. The purchasing
corporation took a greater-than-zero basis in the assets. pursuant to section 334(b)(2),
which allows shareholders to allocate their basis in the stock of the liquidating corporation
among the assets received in liquidation. 168
 This "stepped-up" basis constituted gain to the
purchasing corporation because it was getting more than the liquidating corporation
had.'"
Under South Lake Farms's recovery-based rationale, however, despite a finding of
gain, application of the tax benefit rule was still precluded because the gain was enjoyed
by the shareholders, not by the corporation which took the deduction. "Recovery" did not
equate with a broad concept of gain, but was defined in a more limited way as only that
gain enjoyed by the taxpayer that incurred the deductible cost. This recovery-based
formulation, as applied mechanically by the Ninth Circuit, thus seemed to guarantee that
the tax benefit rule could not by definition apply in section 336 liquidations. Yet the
court's failure to apply the tax benefit rule in South Lake Farms ignored the presence of
real economic gain in the transaction.'m The Commissioner's attempt to reach this
economic gain in in-kind distributions put pressure on the recovery-based rationale to
expand or give way to a different formulation that could be applied in section 336 cases.
Twelve years later the courts responded to this pressure for expansion of the tax
benefit rule in a dramatic way. In Tennessee- Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Commis.sioner
the Tax Court followed a now-familiar course by combining recovery language with a
focus on the corporation's deduction.'" On appeal, however, the Sixth Circuit abandoned
the recovery requirement for a formulation based solely on the element of the deduc-
tion." The result was not only a new hybrid formulation of the tax benefit rule, but also a
split in the circuits. 17'
In Tennessee-Carolina, a transportation company purchased the stock of Service Lines,
Inc., which then liquidated and distributed its assets in kind to its new parent corpora-
tion. 175
 Relying on section 336 the liquidating corporation recognized no gain on the
distribution.'" Among Service's assets were tires and tubes that Service had purchased
i"
'" Cartano, supra note 119, at 222.
"8 Before its repeal by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), 1.R.C. §
334(6)(2) provided: "(2) Transfers to which Section 332(c) Applies. — If property is received by a
corporation in a transfer to which section 332(c) applies, the basis of the property in the hands of the
transferee shall be the same as it would be in the hands of the transferor." See Feld, supra note 4, at
452 n.44, 452-53.
by O'Hare, Corporations and Shareholders, supra note 132, at. 235.
L .' Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d 837, 844 (9th Cir. 1963) (Carter, J.,
dissenting).
1" 65 T.C. 440 (1975).
"2 Id. at 447-48.
1" Tennessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Comm'r, 582 F.2d 378, 382 (6th Cir. 1978).
"' Id. Contra Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d 837, 839 (9th Cir. 1963).
L" 65 T.C. at 441.
1 " 582 F.2d at 380.
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and fully deducted prior to the stock sale.'" At liquidation, the tires had greater than
one-half their useful life remaining."" Tennessee-Carolina recognized no gain on the
transaction pursuant to section 332(a), which protects a parent corporation from recogni-
tion of gain on the receipt of property distributed in complete liquidation of its sub-
sidiary."" Pursuant to section 334(b)(2),'" Tennessee-Carolina took a stepped-up basis in
the distributed tires and tubes, in proportion to their fair market value at the date of
distribution, and, on its own tax return, deducted the tires and tubes as a business
expense.'"
Confronted with a double deduction of that portion of the tires' cost allocable to their
remaining useful life, the Tax Court sought to apply the tax benefit rule to find income to
the liquidating corporation."2 To reach that result, the court first rejected the South Lake
Farms requirement of actual recovery as "unduly restrictive."'"' Then focusing on the
deduction, the court reasoned that the section 162 business deduction of the cost of the
tires and tubes assumed that those items would be consumed within the taxable year."
According to the court, therefore, the tires' useful life remaining into the following year
constituted a "receipt" by the liquidating corporation. 1 H 5 In the words of the court, the
corporation "recovered" the value remaining in the tires." 8 By thus manipulating the
recovery requirement, the Tax Court was able to conclude that the tax benefit rule
required the liquidating corporation to recognize income to the extent that. its earlier
deduction for the tires did not reflect their actual use. 187
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, but expanded the Tax Court's hybrid analysis
even fur( her.'"" While the Tax Court had combined recovery language with a focus on the
premise of the deduction, the Sixth Circuit abandoned the recovery requirement al-
together.'"" The court stated that the tax benefit rule should be applied flexibly to
counteract the inflexibility of the annual accounting system.' According to the court, the
rule should apply whenever there is either an actual recovery or some other event
inconsistent with the prior deduction.'"' The court stated that the transfer to Tennessee-
Carolina of tires with a stepped-up basis was inconsistent with the prior deduction, which
was premised on their total consumption by Service.'"" Applying basis principles, then,
the court found that the inconsistency between the prior deduction and the step-up in
basis created in the transfer was enough to invoke the tax benefit rule.' 93 The Sixth Circuit
177 65 T.C. at 445.
17" Id. at 443.
'" 582 F.2d at 380; I.R.C. § 332(a) (1982).
1" See supra note 168.
1" 582 F.2d at 380; 65 T.C. at 445.
l" For a further discussion of this case, see Morrison, supra note 132, at 917 - 18.




1" Id. at 447 -48; see Bonaire Development. Co. v. Comm'r, 76 T.C. 789, 798 (1981).'
'" 582 F.2d at 382.
11114 Id. at 382-83.
' 90 Id. at 382.
191 Id.
1"' Id. (citing Estate of Block v. Comm'r, 31 R.T.A. 338, 340-41 (1939)). The "inconsistent event"
rationale proposed by the Tax Court was dicta in Block, because the facts presented a true recovery in
the form of a tax refund. See Note, Corporate Distributions of Expensed Assets, supra note 117, at 717.
183 582 F.2d at 382.
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thereby adopted the old "inconsistent event" language of the dicta in Estate of Block as a
way of reaching economic gain in corporate distributions in kind in liquidation.'"
The courts of appeals in South Lake Farms and Tennessee-Carolina had thus reached an
impasse over the proper rationale for application of the tax benefit rule in the context of
corporate liquidations. As the preceding discussion demonstrated, the rule had evolved
into multiple rationales, some recovery-based, others deduction-based. Basis analysis had
enabled some courts to look beyond recovery to the question of gain, and to combine a
finding of gain with a focus on the deduction to create a new hybrid formulation. The
consolidated cases of Hillsboro National Bank and Bliss Dairy presented the United States
Supreme Court with the opportunity, ignored by it earlier in Nash, to resolve this conflict
in the circuits and provide an authoritative formulation.
III. THE OPINION IN HILLSBORO NATIONAL BANK AND Buss DAIRY
In the majority opinion in .Hillsboro National Bank and Bliss Dairy, written by Justice
O'Connor, the Court rejected both lower courts' application of the tax benefit rule,
holding instead that the bank enjoyed no income on the refund to its shareholders, and
that the dairy did have income to the extent of the cattle feed transferred. 195 According to
the Court, the threshold question of whether the tax benefit rule was applicable depended
on the proper formulation of the rule.' 96 The Court then adopted the following new
formulation: "unless a nonrecognition provision of the Internal Revenue Code prevents
it, the tax benefit rule ordinarily applies to require the inclusion of income where events
occur that are fundamentally inconsistent with an earlier deduction."'"
The Court recognized that its new formulation of the tax benefit rule abandoned the
recovery requirement.'" The Court presented two reasons for its decision to reject that
element. First, the true purpose of the rule, according to the Court, was not to tax
recoveries, but rather to approximate the results that would be produced by a tax system
based on transactional, rather than annual, accounting. 1 s" Second, the Court explained
that the recovery requirement injected an undesirable formalism into the tax benefit
analysis.'" According to the Court, retention of the recovery requirement would simply
encourage the government to manipulate its definition of recovery to fit the particular
fact situation in question." 01 Such manipulation, the Court stated, would not advance the
analysis in any way."'
In place of the recovery requirement the Court substituted an "inconsistent event"
test, under which the tax benefit rule would apply whenever events occur that are
fundamentally inconsistent with a taxpayer's earlier deduction.'" The Court offered
some guidelines for determining whether the tax benefit rule as newly formulated should
apply in a given situation."' First, the Court offered a description of what would be
'" See supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
195 Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Comm'r, 460 U.S. 370, 372 (1983).
'96 Id.
"I7 Id.
1" Id. at 381.
1" Id.




203 Id. at 372.
204 Id .
 at 383-86.
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considered a "fundamentally inconsistent event." That phrase, according to the Court,
did not refer to any merely unforeseen event.'" 5 Rather, the Court stated that an event
would be considered fundamentally inconsistent if its occurrence in the same taxable year
as the deduction would have invalidated the deduction,'"
According to the Court, the purpose of the Code provision granting the deduction in
question was a second important element in determining whether the tax benefit rule
should apply.'07 As an example, the Court described a taxpayer who deducted the rent of
a building as a business expense under section 162. 2" If the building were subsequently
converted to a non-business or personal use, the Court stated, the deduction would no
longer be warranted."" According to the Court, the conversion would thus be an event
fundamentally inconsistent with the prior deduction, and therefore would create taxable
income to the extent of the earlier deduction under the tax benefit rule."°
In summarizing its suggestions for application of the newly formulated rule, the
Court emphasized the importance of the purpose of the provision granting the deduction
to the analysis."" Courts must apply the rule on a case-by-case basis, the Court stated,
considering the facts of each case in light of the purpose and function of the provisions
granting the deductions.'° The Court indicated that the element of purpose would be
particularly important in cases involving nonrecognition provisions of the Code. 2 ' 3
The Court then turned to the application of the rule to the facts of the two cases
before it. In Hillsboro National Bank, the Court began its analysis with a review of the Code
provision that granted the deduction.'" The Court noted that section 164(e) allows a
corporation to take a deduction for taxes imposed on its shareholders but paid by it." 5 To
determine the purpose of section I64(e), the Court examined the tax consequences of the
bank's payment on behalf of its shareholders, both with and without section 164(e)." 1 "The
Court found that, if section 164(e) were not available, the bank could not take a deduction
for the tax payment, because the payment would be considered a constructive dividend to
the shareholders."' Without section I 64(e), the Court continued, the payment would be
income to the shareholders."" The transaction would have no economic effect on the
Treasury's revenues, the Court stated, because the shareholders would deduct. the tax
payment from their own income pursuant to section 164(a). 218 The Court found that
2" Id. at 383.
2" Id. at 383-84.
"7 Id. at 385.
2" Id. at 384-85.




22 Id. at 385-86.
214 Id. at 391.
'" 1.R.C. § 164(e) (1982) provides:
(e) Taxes of Shareholders Paid by Corporation. — Where a corporation pays a tax
imposed on a shareholder on his interest as a shareholder, and where the shareholder
does not reimburse the corporation, then —
(1) the deduction allowed by subsection (a) shall be allowed to the corporation; and
(2) no deduction shall be allowed the shareholder for such tax.
2 ' 6







application of section 164(e) would not change the economic effect of the transaction,
because the same deduction would be allowed, but in this case to the corporation.='°
Consequently, the Court concluded that the only possible effect of section 164(e) is to
permit the corporation to deduct a dividend."'
Continuing its examination of the purpose of section 164(e), the Court looked to the
legislative history of the provision. 222 The Court found that Congress intended to provide
relief for corporations simply because they had to make those. payments. 2 • 3 The question
of whether the payment was a tax, the Court reasoned, was thus irrelevant."' According
to the Court, Congress had chosen to grant a subsidy to corporations on the basis of the
act of payment, rather than on the ultimate use of the funds by the state. -'° On this
reasoning, the Court concluded that the bank's earlier deduction was not invalidated by
the later cancellation of the shareholders' tax liability. -'" The Court therefore held that
Hillsboro National Bank was not required to recognize the refund to its shareholders as
income."'
In its analysis of the Bliss Daily case, the Court again began by examining the Code
provision under which the deduction was taken. 2Y" The Court noted that section 162(a),
the Code provision at issue in Bliss, allows a deduction for the ordinary and necessary
expenses of carrying on a trade or business. 22" According to the Court, a deduction under
section 162(a) is predicated upon actual consumption of the expensed asset in the
business operation during that taxable year."' Thus, the Court reasoned, the sale of an
unconsumed but previously expensed asset, or its conversion to a personal use, would be
an event inconsistent with the section 162(a) deduction."' The Court found that Bliss
Dairy's distribution of the expensed assets to its shareholders was a non-business use, "the
analog of personal consumption." 232 Recognizing that section 262 of the Code expressly
provides that personal expenditures are not deductible, the Court concluded that the tax
benefit rule should be applied to require Bliss Dairy to recognize as income the amount of
the unwarranted deduction for the unconsumed feed. 233
Having determined that the tax benefit rule must apply, the Court went on to note,
however, that section 336 of the Code specifically shields corporations from the recogni-
tion of gain in the distribution of assets to shareholders in liquidation. 234
 To identify
whether a conflict existed between the statute and the judicially created tax benefit rule,
the Court examined the question of whether the transaction before it represented the sort
220 hi .
221 Id. at 393.
222 Id.




227 Id, at 394-95.
2" Id. at 395.
22 I.R.C. § 162(a) (1982) provides in pertinent part: "(a) In General. — There shall be allowed
as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on any trade or business . . . ."
Hillsboro Nall Bank, 460 U.S. at 395.
23'
232 Id. at 396.
233
234 Id. at 397.
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of gain intended to be protected under section 336. 235
 According to the Court, the
legislative history of the provision suggested that Congress intended to protect only the
market appreciation not realized by a sale or transfer of the asset to third parties.'"' The
Court. determined that other forms of income arising from the distribution of an asset
were not necessarily exempted from tax.'-'37 Moreover, the Court found that, despite the
broad nonrecognition language, section 336 had been overridden by the statutory recap-
ture provisions, sections 1245 and 1250, which recoup depreciation deductions at the
time the taxpayer disposes of the depreciated asset. 237' Likewise, the Court noted that
section 336 had been overridden by the judicially created doctrine of assignment of
income, which requires that the taxpayer earning income be taxed on it. 239
The Court found further support by analogizing to section 337, which has been
overridden by the tax benefit rule in an accepted series of cases.'" According to the
Court, section 337, which protects corporations from recognition of gain on preliquida-
lion sales of assets, was enacted to guarantee the same tax result whether the assets are
sold, under section 337, or distributed in kind, under section 336. 24 ' Like section 336, the
Court stated, section 337 was intended to shield only market appreciation from tax.'
The Court concluded that Congress intended to maintain these two provisions in par-
ity. 243
 According to the Court, effectuating this intent required that the tax benefit rule be
applied to section 336 liquidations, just as it has been applied in. section 337 liquida-
tions.' The Court therefore held that Bliss Dairy must include in income the amount of
the expensed, unconsumed feed on hand at liquidation. 243
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, wrote a dissenting opinion in Bliss Dairy in
which he argued that a proper application of the tax benefit rule would not give rise to
taxable income because the dairy enjoyed neither an economic benefit nor a recovery:24 "
According to justice Stevens, the tax benefit rule had been universally understood as a
means of characterizing certain recoveries of capital as income, not as a "generalized
method of approximating-
 a transactional accounting system through a fabrication of
income at the drop of a fundamentally inconsistent event.” 217
 The dissent pointed out that
recoveries were a condition precedent under both the case law and the Internal Revenue
Code's section 11 1 . 216 I n Nash v. United Stales,"' Just ice Stevens noted, the Supreme Court
235 Id.
"6 Id. at 398.
237 Id. at 399.
226 Id. at 398. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.1245-1(a) (1971).
"3 Hillsboro Nat'l Bank, 460 U.S. at 398. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
"(' 460 U.S. at 400-01. See, e.g., Connery v. United States, 460 F.2d 1130 (3d Cir. 1972); Spitalny
v, United States, 430 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1970); Commissioner v. Anders, 414 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir.),
eert: denied, 396 U.S. 958 (1969).
'4 ' Hillsboro Nat'l Bank, 460 U.S. at 401.
"2 Id.
"3 Id. at 400,
"1 Id. at 402.
"5
 Id. The Court remanded for a determination of the amount of the expensed, unconsumed
feed on hand at liquidation. Id.
2" Id. at 403 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"' Id. at 407-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"" Id. at 406-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens here referred to the "exclusionary
component" of the tax benefit rule, codified in section 111, which excludes from gross income that
portion of the recovery not resulting in a prior tax benefit. Putoma Corp. v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 652,
664 (1976); see Treas. Reg. § 1111-1(a). This article focuses exclusively on the "inclusionary compo-
nent" of the rule, embodied in the case law.
2" 398 U.S. 1 (1970).
March 1985]	 CASENOTES	 549
had rejected the argument that the tax benefit rule should be expanded to cases in which
the taxpayer had enjoyed an economic benefit, rather than the narrower recovery.'" The
forMulation of the tax rule rejected in Nash, the dissent stated, was remarkably similar to
that adopted by the majority. 25 ' Given that the Court had interpreted the tax benefit rule
in only two prior cases, its opinion in Bliss Dairy, according to Justice Stevens, was without
precedent."''' Although a break with precedent might be understandable in a case of clear
windfall to the taxpayer, the dissent continued, such a departure was inappropriate hi
Bliss Dairy. 253 According to the dissent, the record did not suggest any deliberate tax
avoidance on the corporation's part that might call for a break from past holdings.' 54
The dissent argued that the majority's reformulation of the rule was inappropriate in
other ways. The Bliss Dairy combination of sections 162(a), 333, and 336, the dissent
stated, might result in a stepped-up basis to the shareholders, but that possibility was not
extraordinary.'" Section 333 in fact contemplates just such steps-up in basis, Justice
Stevens stated.' 56 Moreover, according to the dissent, the reformulation would raise new
problems because it lacks a limiting principle. 257 The dissent suggested that the majority's
formulation did not make clear which expensed items would give rise to income, and how
much income would be realized.' In conclusion, Justice Stevens argued that Congress
should be the source of reform on this question, and, consequently, he could not "join in
the Court's attempt to achieve similar results by distorting the tax benefit rule." 259
The Supreme Court's opinion in Hillsboro National Bank and Bliss Dairy, then, ex-
panded dramatically the scope of the tax benefit rule by adopting a deduction-based
formulation first presaged forty years earlier in the Block case. At the same time the Court
rejected the traditional, though sometimes ambiguous, recovery requirement that had
acted as a brake on expansion of the rule. Whether the Court's choice of formulation will
prove beneficial and workable will be examined in the next section of this article.
"* Hillsboro Nat'l Bank, 460 U.S. at 410 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
251 1(1.
2'2 Id. at 412 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
' 53 Id.
2" Id. at 413 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
.2" Id.
Id. at 414 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2" Id. at 415 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
""* Id. at 419 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2" Id. at 421 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Two other justices dissented. Justice Blackmun made two
points in his opinion. First, he would have affirmed the Seventh Circuit in Hillsboro Nat'l Bank, on the
grounds that the focus of the section 164(e) deduction was on the payment of a tax. Id. at 422
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Because events proved that no tax was paid, he argued, some tax benefit
rule should apply. Id. Justice Brennan agreed with Justice Blackmun's position. Id. at 405 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun argued, second, that application of the reformulated tax benefit rule should
result in an adjustment in the tax year for which the deduction was originally claimed. Id. at 425
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated that this approach, comparable to the filing of an
amended tax return, would be more accurate and factually true than the imprecise result yielded
under the current approach, which applies the taxpayer's marginal tax rate in the year of recovery.
Id. at 425-26 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For a similar argument, see Perry v. United States, 160 F.
Supp. 270 (Gt. Cl. 1958) (majority excludes recovery but adds to taxpayer's current tax the amount
by which his prior taxes had been reduced due to the deduction). The dissent in Perry rejected this
"meticulous recomputation" as "not necessary to do equity." Id. at 273.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW FORMULATION OF THE TAX BENEFIT RULE
AND A PROPOSED STATUTORY FORMULATION
The Supreme Court's reformulated tax benefit rule requires that "unless a non-
recognition provision of the internal Revenue Code prevents it, the tax benefit rule
ordinarily applies to require the inclusion of income when events occur that are funda-
mentally inconsistent with an earlier deduction."'" This formulation departs from the
patterns of its predecessors in three ways. First, the old requirement of' recovery, which
the Regulations accompanying section 111  described concretely in terms of "receipt of
amounts" or "cancellations of taxes accrued," has been abandoned."' Application of the
tax benefit rule now turns on the presence of an event fundamentally inconsistent with
the prior deduction."'- Second, the earlier cases that included similar language as an
alternative to the recovery requirement had spoken only of an inconsistent event.'" The
Court has added qualifying language to this test so that now the subsequent event must be
"fundamentally" inconsistent with the prior deduction.'" Finally, the Court has added a
new clause reflecting an issue raised in the corporate liquidation cases: the rule will now
apply "unless a nonrecognition provision of the Internal Revenue Code prevents
it... ." 265
In rejecting the old recovery requirement, the Court moved the law in the proper
direction. With the recovery requirement the reach of the rule was limited to very few fact
situations — bad debt repayments, tax refunds, and cancellations of indebtedness.' The
Court's new formulation seems to have gone too far in expanding the rule, however, and
has injected an undesirable uncertainty into this area of the law.'167
 By substituting the
requirement of a fundamentally inconsistent event, the Court has set the law adrift by
making the rule fact-specific."" The inherent vagueness of the phrase, combined with its
dependence on a case-by-case application, will likely cause taxpayers difficulty in predict-
ing the outcomes of certain transactions.'"
An additional question raised by the reformulation is how the rule will interact with
the various corporate liquidation provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. The Court
acknowledged the inherent tension between the tax benefit rule and the statutory non-
recognition provisions, both in its opinion and in the new qualifying clause."' The Court
did not, however, describe how a court would determine whether a nonrecognition
provision would prevent application of the rule, and whether such a determination in one
case would control the determination of other cases involving the same nonrecognition
265 Hillsboro Nat'l Bank, 460 U.S. at 372.
"' Treas. Reg. § 1.111-1(a)(2) (1960). See supra note 8 for a brief' description of section 111.
262 Hillsboro Nat'l Bank, 460 U.S. at 372.
263 Grace M. Barnett v. Comm'r, 39 B.T.A. 864 (1939); Estate of Block v. Comm'r, 39 B.T.A.
338 (1939).
264 Hillsboro Nat'l Bank, 460 U.S. at 372.
265 Id.
266 Feld, supra note 4, at 460. According to the Court, however, cancellations of indebtedness
could not be classed as recoveries. See Hillsboro Nat'l Bank, 460 U.S. at 382 n.13, 387 n.22.
16' O'Hare, Liquidations, supra note 116, at 202.
"" See Blum, The Role of the Supreme Court in Federal Income Tax Controversies — Hillsboro National




 Hillsboro Nat'l Bank, 460 U.S. at 385.
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provision.'" This "inherent tension," when combined with the requirement of determin-
ing the legislative purpose underlying the deduction-granting provision, suggests that the
rule must be applied by the courts as a balancing test. in the already complex area of
corporate liquidations, this possible balancing approach will create new uncertainty for
taxpayers and tax law practitioners.
Finally, the vagueness and unpredictability of the new formulation raise structural
questions concerning the proper relationship between judicial and statutory law in the tax
area. The Court's decision can be justified on the ground that, since the courts developed
the tax benefit rule, it is the courts that should update the rule in response to the changing
demands of the tax field. The Supreme Court's updating of the rule, however, gives it an
expanded form that one scholar called "imperialistic."' If the Court had other judicially
created doctrines on which to decide the Hillsboro and Bliss Dairy cases, the question arises
whether it should have undertaken to expand the rule so significantly, rather than leaving
resolution of the policy issues implicit in such an expansion to Congress.
A. The New Rule Applied in Hillsboro National Bank
The Court's reformulation of the tax benefit rule creates even more uncertainty
regarding proper application of the rule than existed prior to the Bliss Dairy and Hillsboro
National Bank decisions. That the reformulated rule yields two possible, conflicting results
when applied to the facts of Hillsboro National Bank exemplifies this uncertainty.
At first glance Hillsboro might be mistaken for a classic tax benefit rule case because it
involves a tax refund of an earlier deduction." The twist is that there is no "recovery" in
the limited sense of a reimbursement to the taxpayer who incurred the deductible
expense. Instead, the personal property taxes were refunded to the shareholders, on
whom the tax was imposed, rather than to the bank, which had made the tax payments
and taken the deduction." 4 As it argued in its brief, under the old recovery formulation
the bank would undoubtedly have been held not to have recovered the tax payments.'"
Because the refund was paid directly to the shareholders, the bank enjoyed no recovery to
trigger application of the rule.'"
The Court reached the same result under its new formulation that it would have
under the recovery standard, holding that the rule did not apply to the bank." r The
opposite result, however, seems more logical under the Court's reformulation. Under the
reformulation, an analysis of the Hillsboro facts would start with a review of the purpose of
the provision granting the deduction.'" The plain language of section 164(e) suggests
that its purpose is to grant a deduction for tax payments, so that the bank would have
premised its deduction on the presence of its shareholders' tax liability.'" Illinois' later
"' The Court in its own determination of whether the tax benefit rule should override section




& Kanner, supra note 4, at 284.
"3 See 1 J. MERMNS, supra note 2, § 7.36.
"4 Hillsboro Nat'l Bank, 460 U.S. at 379.
"2 Brief for the Appellant in No. 81-485 at 6, Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Comm'r, 641 F.2d 529
(7th Cir. 1981).
276 id.
277 Hillsboro Nat'l Bank, 460 U.S. at 372.
2" Id. at 385.
'79 Brief for the Respondent in No. 81 -485 at 8, 10, Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Comm'r, 641 F.2d
529 (7th Cir. 1981).
552	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 26:529
repeal of the tax exemplifies an event that is fundamentally inconsistent with the bank's
premise in taking the deduction."" Under the majority's test, the tax refund to Hillsboro's
shareholders would, therefore, he taxable income to the bank.'" The same conclusion
results from applying the Court's corollary that an event is fundamentally inconsistent
where, if that event had occurred within the same taxable year, it would have foreclosed
the deduction."' If repeal had occurred in the same taxable year as the deduction, the
bank would riot have been entitled to a section I 64(e) deduction because its shareholders
would have incurred no tax liability."' In that situation, the bank would probably not
have even considered taking a section I64(e) deduction.
This logic persuaded scholars,'" Justices Blackmun and Brennan,"" and the Seventh
Circuit"' that Hillsboro National Bank was taxable on the refund under the tax benefit
rule. The majority, however, reached the opposite conclusion by finding a different
purpose underlying the section 164(e) deduction.'" According to the Court, Congress's
purpose in enacting section 164(e) was to provide relief for banks making payments for
their shareholders. 2"8 Consequently, the question of whether those payments were made
to satisfy a tax liability — the threshold question on the face of the provision — was
deemed by the Court to be irrelevant." The Court concluded that repeal of the Illinois
tax was not fundamentally inconsistent with the bank's prior deduction "as long as the
payment itself was not negated by a refund to the corporation. . ." 2"
The peculiar reasoning of the majority in Hillsboro National Bank demonstrates the
vagueness of the Court's inconsistent event formulation. if an event's fundamental
inconsistency is dependent on the judicial determination of the purpose of the
deduction-granting statute, there can be as many views of inconsistency as there are of
legislative purpose. One obvious question arising under the analysis is when should a
court look beyond the face of the provision for some additional statement of purpose. If',
for example, the case involves deductions under a Code provision the purpose of which is
to implement sonic extrinsic social policy, the court presumably must decide whether to
adhere to the language of the statute, or to try to implement the underlying social policy.
The majority opinion failed to address this issue.
Additional confusion results because the Court seemed to return to the old recovery
requirement at the conclusion of its opinion, stating that the bank's deduction would be
invalidated only if the taxes had been refunded directly to it."' The Court did not
mention inconsistent events in this discussion, but instead relied on the absence of a
2" Id.
Id. at 10.
2". 460 U.S. at 383-84.
283 Brief for the Respondent in No. 81-485 at 33. The majority disputed this interpretation. See
460 U.S. at 345 n.30.
284 Feld, supra note 4, at 451; Note, Tax Treatment of Previously Experued Assets, supra note 94, at
1663 n.129; Laeger, supra note 14, at 8.
2" 460 U.S. at 422 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 403 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2" Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Comm'r, 641 F.2d 529, 531 (7th Cir. 198!).
287 460 U.S. at 394-95.
2" Id. at 394.
289 Id.
2" Id.
"' "As long as the payment itself was not negated by a refund to the corporation, the change in





repayment to the bank." 2 That the Court thus chose to emphasize some elements of the
rule, while ignoring others, suggests that application may depend ultimately on a court's
sense of what result is equitable. The majority's observation that the annual accounting
system creates transactional inequities which it is the purpose of the tax benefit rule to
correct reinforces the validity of this comment.' 93
If application of the rule depends more on equity than on meeting the rule's specific
requirement of inconsistency with legislative purpose, the real question becomes whether
the reformulation will in fact produce more equitable results than its predecessors. In
early cases involving bad debts, it was the recovery requirement that insured an equitable
result by tying taxation to actual receipt by the taxpayer of the amount that taxpayer had
previously deducted.'" That result was equitable because the party who benefitted from
the deduction paid the tax; moreover, that party had the cash recovery with which to pay
the tax. The court in South Lake Farms recognized the equitable nature of the recovery
requirement when it stated that it would adhere to the recovery requirement because to
tax the old corporation on benefits the shareholders received would be "unfair."'-95 Unlike
the old recovery requirement, however, inconsistent event analysis does not seem
grounded in equitable concerns. The reformulation abandons, for example, the element
of the recovery requirement that required the taxpayer who took the deduction to be the
same one who receives the economic benefit of the recovery. A result in which Hillsboro
Bank would owe tax on the refund, even though its shareholders alone received the cash,
would seem patently unfair. Such a result, however, is entirely possible under the Court's
reformulation.'"
In summary, the Hillsboro National Bank facts are susceptible of competing interpreta-
tions — one arising logically from the language of inconsistent event, the other apparently
based on a sense of equity. This possible divergence of results suggests the difficulty
courts may encounter in applying the tax benefit rule consistently. The Supreme Court's
curious reasoning in Hillsboro National Bank indicates that the precise requirements of the
tax benefit rule will have to be determined in future litigation.
B. Application of the New Formulation to Corporate Liquidations
According to the Court in Hillsboro National Bank, the recovery and fundamentally-
inconsistent-event formulations would both have produced the same result: Hillsboro
Bank would not be taxable on its shareholders' refunds no matter which of the two
rationales was applied. The same cannot be said of the result in Bliss Dairy. Recovery was
too crude and mechanical a test to reach the facts of Bliss Dairy, where an economic gain
arose from a prior deduction, taking the form of a step-up in basis that was shielded from
recognition by a Code provision. In reaction to the limited scope of the recovery require-
292 Id.
n Id. at 377, 383.
294 See Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399, 403 n.5 (1967) ("The tax
benefit rule is an equitable doctrine which should be carried to an equitable condusion."); Perry v.
United States, 160 F. Supp. 270, 271 (Ct. Cl. 1958) ("The only rational basis for such decisions
[applying the tax benefit rule to recoveries] is that it would be inequitable for the taxpayer to reduce
his taxes for prior years on account of the contributions, and not to pay taxes on them when he got
them back."); Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Comm'r, 641 F.2d 529, 533 (7th Cir. 1981) (Pell, J., dissenting);
Bittker Sc Kanner, supra note 4, at 284.
299 324 F.2d 837, 839 (9th Cir. 1963).
"" Feld, supra note 4, at 451.
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menr, the Supreme Court in Hillsboro National Bank and Bliss Dairy expanded the tax
benefit rule to reach the gain created in the liquidation of the dairy.
Some expansion of the tax benefit rule was undoubtedly necessary. The history of
prior judicial experimentation with differing rationales manifested a felt need to increase
the scope of the rule. 297 Also, an authoritative formulation at the Supreme Court level was
surely desirable to halt the proliferation of new rationales in the lower courts. 298 The
question arises, however, whether a "fundamentally inconsistent event" test clears up the
confusion. In the area of corporate liquidations the reformulation may complicate rather
than simplify t he analysis. The potential for confusion can be illustrated by applying the
Court's reformulated rule to corporate stock purchases and liquidations under Code
sections 338, 334(b)(1), and 333, each of which illustrates a different problem. A section
338 hypothetical demonstrates the practical difficulties of applying the new test, while the
section 334(b)(1) example shows how the rule can create taxable income where no gain in
fact resulted. Finally, the section 333 case illustrates the new rule's potential for unpredic-
tability where a Code provision embodies more than one legislative purpose.
As a starting point, analysis of the impact of the reformulated tax benefit rule on
section 338 cases demonstrates the complexity of applying the Court's new test. The Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) enacted section 338 to replace
section 334(14(2), which was thereby repealed. 299 Before TEFRA, a parent corporation
had to liquidate its subsidiary under section 332 to take the subsidiary's assets at the
stepped-up basis allowed by section 334(b)(2)." Section 338 removes the necessity of this
complicated maneuver by allowing the parent corporation to take a stepped-up basis in
the subsidiary's assets without liquidating it. 30 ' Under section 338, the transaction is a
deemed sale to which section 337 nonrecognition expressly applies. 3"
To determine whether the tax benefit rule is applicable to a section 338 transaction,
the Court would require that the transaction be evaluated in terms of the purpose of t he
deduction-granting provision, to resolve whether a subsequent event was inconsistent
with that deduction. The Tennessee-Carolina facts provide a good hypothetical for testing
this analysis, because the transaction was structured under old section 334(b)(2), now
replaced by section 338.' In this hypothetical, Corporation A purchases tires and cur-
rently deducts the cost under section 162. In a later taxable year, Corporation A transfers
the tires, which still have some useful life, to the parent Corporation B, which takes a
297 See supra notes 154-90 and accompanying text.
"' The Nash Court could have halted this proliferation of rationales by giving its imprimatur to
either the recovery-based or deduction-based rationale, but the Court failed to do so. See supra notes
116-17.
3" General Explanation of TEFRA, Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation 131, 131 (Dec. 31, 1982);
Cartano, supra note 119, at 219.
3" See supra note 168. Section 334(6)(2), in effect before TEFRA, codified Kimbell-Diamond
Milling Co. v. Comm'r, 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aff 'd per curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 825 (1951) (holding that if a corporation purchases the stock of another corporation and
immediately dissolves it, the purchasing corporation is deemed to have purchased the assets, rather
than the stock, of the other corporation).




Section 338 — Stock Purchases Treated as Asset Purchases for Tax Purposes, 60 TAXES 930,
983 (1982).
3" Tennessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Comm'r, 582 F.2d 378, 380 (6th Cir. 1978). See
supra note 299.
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stepped-up basis in the tires under section 338. Under section 337, expressly incorpo-
rated into section 338, Corporation B is shielded from recognition of gain on this transfer.
Under the fundamentally-inconsistent-event formulation the analysis would he cum-
bersome and drawn out. A court would determine, first, the purpose of the section 162
deduction, which in this case seems straightforward — to allow a current deduction for
expenses in carrying on a trade or business.'" However, whether this purpose turns on
the business use of the asset, or on the current use of the asset within the tax year, will
affect the second step of the analysis.
That second step is to identify what was the inconsistent event.. 3°' Two possibilities
present themselves. The useful life of the tires extending into a subsequent taxable year is
an inconsistent event if the purpose of the deduction turns on the currency of the asset's
use — that is, if the section 162 deduction allows taxpayers to recover only the cost of
those assets fully consumed in the same taxable year. Arguably, however, like unrealized
appreciation, that value should not be taxed absent a disposition of the asset. 306 A second
possible inconsistent event, then, would be a disposition of the asset in the form of the
transfer of the tires to Corporation B. Perhaps the best view is that the inconsistent event
embodies both elements: the ongoing use of currently expensed assets beyond the taxable
year, combined with a subsequent disposition. If the tires were converted from a business
use, of course, the deduction would be inconsistent whether or not the tires were worn out
in the year of the deduction.
A court's third step would be to decide whether the event is "fundamentally" incon-
sistent with the prior deduction — that is, whether its occurrence in the same year as the
deduction would have "foreclosed" the deduction. 307 Applying this prong of the test
returns the analysis to the purpose of the deduction. The tires are no less a deductible
business asset because they have been transferred, so the transfer would not appear to
foreclose the deduction. The question must instead be whether the tires' useful life
remaining into the subsequent taxable year would foreclose the earlier deduction. If that
were the case, all unused but expensed assets could be taxable in each year that they are
not finally consumed. Administrative convenience argues against such a result. 10" The
transfer thus must be the critical factor.
A court would next have to determine whether the nonrecognition provision section
337 prevents application of the tax benefit rule. 305 The cases under section 337 suggest
that the tax benefit rule would apply, although the drafters of section 338 may not have
considered or intended such a result."'
Those three steps would encompass the analysis under the Court's new rule. In
practice, however, a court would also have to determine whether the income is taxed to
the parent or the subsidiary. The new formulation, on its face, fails to specify which
corporation should he taxed.'" Importing prior tax benefit. rule case law suggests, how-
304 See, e.g., Hillsboro Nat'l Bank, 46{) U.S. at 395.
"5 Id.
3°6 Note, Corporate Distribution of Expensed Assets, supra note 117, at 721. Under the internal
Revenue Code, appreciation is not taxed. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) (1982) (definition of gross income
"gains derived from dealings in property").
307 See Hillsboro Nat'l Bank, 460 U.S. at 383-84.
308 See Spitalny v. United States, 430 F.2d 195, 197 (9th Cir. 1970) (section 162(a) regulation "is
intended ... to accomplish over a period of years roughly the same result as would have been had
through use of the inventory method, but by a simpler form of accounting").
310 See supra note 120.
3 " See Hillsboro Nat'l Bank, 460 U.S. at 372. This question would arise under the tax benefit rule
because of its history of requiring a recovery to the party that took the deduction. Arguably under
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ever, that the party taking the deduction is taxed on the recovery." The court would thus
find that the subsidiary, Corporation A, is taxable on the section 338 transfer to the extent
of the prior deduction.
Application of the new rule to section 338 cases thus suggests how complex the
process of analysis can be. Application of the rule to corporate liquidations under section
334(b)(1) demonstrates a different concern: the new formulation can result in unwar-
ramed taxes — specifically, in a finding of taxable income even where no gain was created
in the transaction.' In the section 334(b)(1) situation a subsidiary corporation is shielded
from recognition of gain on the distribution of expensed property to its parent corpora-
tion in liquidation. 3 " The subsidiary's basis is carried over to the parent. 3 ' 5
 Under the
Court's analysis, a court could logically find that the liquidation is fundamentally inconsis-
tent with the prior deduction because a liquidation terminates the business and thereby
forecloses the possibility of that corporation currently consuming the expensed asset as
required by section 162(a). 316
 A court could also find that the nonrecognition provision,
section 336, does not prevent application of the tax benefit rule, based on the tax policy
arguments for parity with section 337 advanced by the Court in Bliss Dai7. 3 ' 7 Under the
Court's analysis, then, the tax benefit rule could be applied to require the subsidiary to
take the value of the expensed property into income.
The above reasoning is flawed, however, because it results in a finding of taxable
income where no gain was created in the transaction. The Court's reformulation makes
no express mention of gain or economic recovery, yet the tax system in theory can tax
only gain or an increase in the taxpayer's net worth." In section 334(b)(I) liquidations,
however, no gain is created on t he distribution because the subsidiary's basis carries over
to the parent corporation. Because the basis carries over, the Internal Revenue Service
has indicated that the tax benefit rule would not apply. 3 '9 The Supreme Court's reformu-
lation of the tax benefit rule ignores this necessary element of gain and instead focuses on
the subjective factors of inconsistency and the purpose underlying the deduction-
granting provision.
Bliss Dairy's liquidation under section 333 provides one last illustration of the
difficulties created by the Court's reformulation of the tax benefit rule.' In t his case the
section 338, however, any liability, including tax benefit recapture, would be taxed to the old
subsidiary.
312 See, e.g., Grace M. Barnett v. Comm'r, 39 I.C.'' 	 864, 868 (1939) (the taxpayer who took the
deduction was required to "restore to income the amount previously allowed as a deduction ....").
313 Section 334(b)(1) would be employed in conjunction with sections 332 and 336 to structure a
partial liquidation whereby the parent corporation takes a carry-over basis in the assets and no gain
or loss is recognized on the transaction.
O'Hare, Liquidations, supra note 116, at '204.
315 Id.
a'" See Hillsboro Nat'l Bank, 460 U.S. at 395.
317 Id. at 402. See also B. BUITKER & J. Eus-ricE, supra note 125, at 11-14, for a discussion of
parity between sections 336 and 337.
3" See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940) (donor of interest coupon is taxable on the
interest because it enjoyed an economic gain on the transaction).
3" Rev. Rul. 74-396, 1974-2, C.B. 106 (tax benefit rule should apply in liquidations governed by
sections 332 and 334(b)(2), taxable liquidations under section 331, and tax-free liquidations under
section 333, but not to liquidations governed by sections 332 and 334(b)(1) where carry-over basis
exists).
Section 333 would be employed in conjunction with sections 334(c) and 336 to structure a
complete one-month liquidation whereby the shareholders take a carry-over basis in the assets and
no gain or loss is recognized on the disposition.
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problem arises from the presence of conflicting legislative purposes underlying the
statute, each of which could lead to a different result. Under section 333 certain share-
holders can elect in a one-month liquidation to defer recognition of income on the
distribution of assets in kind." Bliss Dairy's transfer of currently expensed but uncon-
sumed assets in liquidation satisfied the first step of the Court's analysis. That transfer was
inconsistent with the premise of section 162(a), the deduction-granting provision, under
the Court's interpretation of the provision's purpose."' Also according to the Court in
Bliss Dairy, section 336 does not prevent application of the tax benefit rule. 3'3 The
legislative purpose of section 333, however, is in conflict with the application of the rule.
Section 333 expressly contemplates deferral of gain to the shareholders until the
asset is converted into capital."' But application of the tax benefit rule would result in
increased current taxable income to the shareholders."' Such a result occurs because the
income recovered under the rule would increase the corporation's earnings and profits,
which are currently taxable to the shareholders under section 333(f). 3''e Moreover, the
earnings and profits are taxed at ordinary income rates, rather than the preferential
capital gains rates that ordinarily would be applied.' Consequently, application of the
rule would increase both the amount of taxable income and the rate at which it is taxed.
In applying the reformulation in section 333 cases, then, a court would arguably be
required to rank the purposes and policies of the relevant statutes before determining
whether application of the rule is warranted. This ranking is an arduous analytical
process, requiring courts to delve into tax policies that may be obscure or conflicting. The
Court's approach in Bliss Dairy, however, suggested such a balancing approach. The
Court considered not merely the legislative purpose underlying the deduction-granting
provision, but also weighed the purpose underlying section 336, and that section's rela-
tionship with other Code provisions."'
As these examples have demonstrated, courts after Hillsboro National Bank must
37 I.R.C. § 333 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
(a) General Rule. — In the case of property distributed in complete liquidation of a
domestic corporation .. . , if —
(1) the liquidation is made in pursuance of a plan of liquidation adopted, and
(2) the distribution is in complete cancellation or redemption of all the stock, and the
transfer of all the property under the liquidation occurs within some one calender
month, then in the case of each qualified electing shareholder . . , , gain on the shares
owned by him at the time of the adoption of the plan of liquidation shall be recognized
only to the extent provided in subsections (e) and (f).
312 See Hillsboro Nat'l Bank, 460 U.S. at 395.
32' Id. at 402.
McGaffey, The Deferral of Gain in One-Month Liquidations, 19 Tax L. REV 327, 328 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as McGaffey]. Typically, section 333 is elected by shareholders of a closely held
corporation owning tangible assets that have greatly appreciated in value since the corporation
acquired them. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 125, § 11.20. Section 333 was enacted to relieve
the hardship that would result to these shareholders if' they were required to "pay tax on the
appreciation of the distributed assets, with no accompanying realization of casts with which to pay the
tax. McGaffey, supra, at 328.
"" See O'Hare, Liquidations, supra note 116, at 203.
""
3" McGaffey, supra note 324, at 331. Internal Revenue Code section 331 provides that gain to
shareholders in corporate liquidation be taxed at capital gain rates ("Amounts received by a share-
holder in a distribution in complete liquidation of a corporation shall be treated as in full payment in
exchange for the stock."). 1.R.C. § 331 (1982).
32' Hillsboro Nat'l Bank, 460 U.S. at 397-98.
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consider many factors in determining whether the reformulated tax benefit rule should
apply in a given liquidation situation. The number of possible grounds for application,
and the complex policy balancing involved, suggest that the rule will create new unpredic-
tability in the law. In the area of corporate liquidations, further litigation may be neces-
sary to determine the relative significance of the legislative purposes underlying each
pertinent Code provision.
C. Structural Problems Suggested by the Reformulated Rule
In addition to the questions of proper application raised in the preceding two
subsections, the Supreme Court's expansive reformulation of the tax benefit rule raises
questions about the proper relationship between statutory and judicial rules in the tax
law. If other judicial principles were available to decide Hillsboro National Bank and Bliss
Daily, the question arises whether it was appropriate for the Court to have expanded the
tax benefit rule so significantly instead of leaving this policy decision to Congress."'" The
following comparison of the tax benefit rule and analogous Code provisions points up the
structural inconsistencies made possible by a judicially expanded rule.
In general, the tax benefit rule operates as a judicially created recapture rule that
supplements statutory recapture provisions in the Code."" Sections 1245 and 1250, for
example, apply to recapture depreciation taken on certain types of business property,
while the tax benefit rule reaches currently deductible costs for individuals and businesses
alike."' Like the tax benefit rule, sections 1245 and 1250 override the nonrecognition
provisions of sections 336 and 337, requiring that gain from the disposition of certain
depreciable assets be taxed as ordinary income to the extent of the prior deductions for
depreciation."' These provisions are by their own terms inapplicable to transactions
where no stepped-up basis is created, as in section 332/334(a) liquidations and section 351
incorporations."'"
The existence of statutory recapture provisions seems to bolster the argument for
judicial expansion of the tax benefit rule, on the grounds that the lax treatment of
currently deductible property should be the same as for depreciated property."' In fact,
Congress may have been open to such a policy in 1975, when a bill was introduced to
extend section 1245 to cover assets previously expensed under section 162(a). 33s The
structural issue, however, is not only whether deductible and depreciable assets should be
treated alike, but whether, as a policy matter, such a determination should he statutory,
administrative, or judicial. Consistency and ease of administration argue for a statutory
solution.
3" Blum, supra note 268, at 366. See also Epstein, The Tax Benefit Rule in Corporate Liquidations, 6
TAX ADVISOR 454, 458-59 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Epstein].
"" See, e.g.,	 §§ 1245, 1250-1252. (1982).
331 Treas. Reg. § 1.1245-3(a) (1971); § 1250-1(e) (1976). Section 167 of the Internal Revenue
Code allows businesses a deduction for. depreciation.
5" Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1245-6(b), 1.1250-1(c)(2) (1976).
333 Feld, supra note 4, at 450 n.36. Section 351 generally provides nonrecognition of gain to
individuals on transfer of assets in exchange for stock of a corporation whiCh they will control.
"4
 Hillsboro Nat'l Bank, 460 U.S. at 398; Epstein, supra note 329, at 459-60.
" 5
 H.R. 10,936, 94th Cong., Dec. 10, 1975. See S. Rep. No. 1346, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976);
H.R. Rep. No. 1350, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). The bill passed the House but failed to reach the
Senate before adjournment. Note, Tax Treatment of Previously Expensed Assets, supra note 94, at 1652
n.75.
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The difficulty in any attempt to achieve consistency among the statutory, administra-
tive, and judicial elements of the tax law arises in part because the enactment of any given
Code provision may be inspired by multiple purposes. 336 As a result, courts will likely be
frustrated when they look to the Code for one policy to guide them in reformulating
judicial rules to conform to statutory policy. Broadly viewed, for example, the Code
provisions regarding corporate liquidations express two conflicting purposes. On the one
hand, the provisions seek to avoid setting up either barriers or incentives to changes in
enterprise form. 337 On the other hand, the sections seek to exploit the opportunity,
created by such a change in enterprise form, to reach gain arguably created by the
accounting methods of the outgoing business."" Sections 336 and 337 serve the first
purpose — to avoid burdening changes in enterprise form — by protecting market
appreciation from recognition in liquidation. 33" The tax benefit rule serves the second
broad purpose by taking advantage of the liquidation event to tax the out going business
on the transfer of its expensed assets. Sections 336 and 337 also operate to eliminate the
usual double taxation of corporations by providing nonrecognition of gain at the corpo-
rate level, whereas expanding the tax benefit rule would allow taxation of liquidations at
both the corporate and shareholder level."' The structural question embodied in these
examples is whether, in the case of conflicting or multiple purposes in the law, Congress
should not be the initiator of policy change.
These structural questions would be strictly academic if the Supreme Court had not
had other judicial principles upon which to decide Hillsboro National Bank and Bliss Dairy.
Hillsboro National Bank, however, could have been decided under the old recovery re-
quirement, with no change in the tax benefit rule."' The effect of such a ruling, as was the
case in Nash v. United States, would have been to leave the rule unchanged. 342 Alternative
grounds were also available in Bliss Dairy. The Court could have based its decision on a
series of cases in which the Commissioner of Internal Revenue was allowed to apply
section 446(b) when a taxpayer goes out of business.' Section 446(b) provides that the
Commissioner may change the taxpayer's method of accounting when it does not clearly
reflect income."' Section 446(b) would presumably apply on the Bliss Daisy facts, because
the dairy's hooks failed to reflect the potential income represented by the fully expensed
but unconsumed cattle feed. Although the Court may have ignored the section 446(b)
option because it was not raised by the parties in their briefs, the Court did have an
alternative theory to turn to if it had wanted to decide the cases without making a major
policy change in the tax benefit rule.
D. Proposed Statutory Solution
The problems created by a judicial expansion of the tax benefit rule suggest that the
solution should instead be statutory. This casenote indicated that the basis analysis
336 See, e.g., supra notes 321-28 and accompanying text.
337 Note, Tax Treatment of Previously Expensed Assets, supra note 94, at 1664.
I" Byrne, supra note 24, at 221.
339 See General Util, & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935); see also supra note 132.
34° Cartano, supra note 119, at 237.
341 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
343
	 Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1 (1970).
343 See Standard Paving Co. v. Comm'r, 190 F.2d 330 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 860
(1951); jud Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Comm'r, 153 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1946).
344 1.R.C. § 446(b) (1982).
560	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 26:529
applied by the Ninth Circuit in Spitalny v. United States 345 produced the same tax result as
the traditional recovery-based rationale, but expanded that rationale in such a way as to
expose the gain created in the transaction."' That basis analysis offers an ideal legislative
solution to the problems posed by the corporate liquidation cases.
Spitalny was decided on the fundamental principle that where subsequent events
produce a basis in the asset greater than the basis left after the prior deduction, the
positive difference between those two amounts is taxable income to the taxpayer who took
the deduction."' In corporate liquidations, that principle would be applied where the
transaction created a basis in the hands of the transferee that was higher than the basis in
the hands of the transferor. Two simple mechanical tests would determine the presence
of such gain. First, gain would be created in a transaction that produced a step-up in basis.
A transaction resulting in a carry-over basis would produce no gain, and the tax benefit
rule would not apply. 34" Second, the rule would operate only in the absence of a recogni-
tion event. 349 Statutory nonrecognition provisions such as sections 336 and 337, for
example, by definition cancel out realization of the income in the transaction. Where
either of these provisions applied the tax benefit rule would automatically override as
long as the first requirement of a step-up in basis was present.
A statutory tax benefit rule formulated in terms of basis would eliminate many of the
problems of the Court's expansive rule. Basis analysis is simple: the presence of a
stepped-up basis can be determined through accounting procedures. Such a rule would
also have the advantage of replacing the subjective factor of "inconsistency" and the need
to balance conflicting legislative purposes with the familiar technical concept of basis. As a
result application of the statutory rule would be easier and more predictable, and would
spare the courts from having to make policy judgments on a case-by-case basis.
CONCLUSION
In Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner and United States v. Bliss Dairy, Inc., the
Supreme Court abandoned the original tax benefit rule requiring a taxpayer who recov-
ers an amount deducted in a prior year to report that amount as income in the year of
recovery. In its place the Court substituted a new and expanded formulation, under
which the tax benefit rule is to apply when events occur that are fundamentally inconsis-
tent with the prior deduction. While the old rule was too limited and inflexible to reach a
variety of fact situations, the new formulation has gone to the other extreme. The rule's
dependence on an interpretation of the legislative purpose underlying the deduction-
granting provision on which the taxpayer relied suggests that conflicting results can arise
where a provision has more than one plausible purpose. In the complex area of corporate
34 ' 430 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1970).
3"
 See supra note 145.50 and accompanying text.
347 Spitalny, 430 F.2d at 196-97.
348
 In Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1 (1970), basis analysis would have enabled the Court to
frame its reasoning in technical language. The Court had found no economic gain where the
transferee corporation took the transferor partnership's accounts receivable at their face amount less
the bad debt reserve. Id. at 5. Put differently, the partnership's basis carried over to the corporation.
349
 The two elements of stepped-up basis and recognition event usually occurred together in
liquidation under sections 332, 334(b)(2), and 336, which produced the cases on which the circuits
were split. Compare Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963) with
Tennessee-Carolina transportation, Inc. v. Comm'r, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978).
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liquidations, the Court's long and cumbersome analysis will add further complication. A
straightforward technical solution such as basis analysis could of course be produced by
the courts, drawing on precedents in Spitalny and Tennessee-Carolina. But given the
complexity of the tax law, a statutory solution is surely preferable. Congress is the body
that can best establish policy in light of the many conflicting interests at stake. Further
specifics can then be furnished in the Regulations if necessary. The courts would thereby
be left free to function in their proper role as arbiters of fact-specific disputes.
The availability of a straightforward technical solution, such as that presented by
basis analysis, highlights the fundamental issue in t he Hillsboro and Bliss Dairy cases. That
issue is a structural one: whether the Supreme Court should refrain from making changes
in the tax law that are so significant as to reach tax policy.
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